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INTRODUCTION 
In a broader sense, CSR became an issue mainly in the recent years. The evolution 
of this phenomenon   is largely to be credited to the neoliberalist era that began in the last 
quarter of the 20th century and continues to dominate the new millennium. Not 
surprisingly, the conceptual and operational definitions of CSR are subject to as many 
controversies and disappointments as is the outcome of neoliberalist economics 
manifested in looming threats to social, economic and environmental sustainability.  The 
scope of this study is, however, only limited to addressing the issue of CSR. The analysis 
is carried out by adopting an inductive approach while probing into both interconnected 
aspects and disconnected separate currents of the phenomenon. The interconnectivity of 
CSR relates the capitalist paradigm with the individual/collective human behaviour. The 
disconnection on the other hand refers to specific real world issues with local and global 
contexts involving simultaneous but unequal capitalist development in the North and the 
South.  The paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 reflects on the relationship between 
instinctive and ethical behaviour of the entrepreneurs. The former is driven by the 
motivational force of self-interest exhibited in efforts to   accumulate   producer surplus, 
while   the latter demands   social responsibility under the influence of intrinsic    and/or 
extrinsic regulations. Part II presents a brief review of the literature    on CSR, largely 
relating to the corporate sector in the North. Finally, Part III of the paper analyses the 
literature on CSR in the developing countries and highlights its recent origins in a world 
where Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) are increasingly underscoring the North-South 
divide in gains from economic globalisation.   
I.  ELEMENTS AND COMPOUND1 
Human society happens to be an artificial construct evolved through a process of 
successive making and remaking of positive laws in the realm of both sociology and 
technology. The positive laws in sociology are the rules and regulation governing the 
edifice of human society at each level of existence. Before getting into different forms of 
positive laws, it is important to first understand their rationale which, in turn, requires the  
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understanding of biologically governed behavioural traits. At a broader level, the latter 
are recognised as instinctive behaviour with the survivalist instinct being strongest of all.  
It therefore follows that effort to remain the fittest, widely recognised as self-interest, 
happens to be a natural right of all creatures. That said, a vast majority of  humankind  
also like to call themselves the supreme creature or the higher organism owing to  another 
two  natural endowments; namely, superior intellect and the ability to change the things 
for better or for worse. These two endowments and self-interest, the strongest of all 
instincts, together underscore  the significance of positive laws of sociology which have 
always existed in every society, however small or big, developed or underdeveloped, 
ancient or modern. More explicitly, the positive laws in sociology provide a regulatory 
mechanism for human behaviour which is driven by both selfish and altruistic motives. 
The selfish motives come spontaneously and effortlessly with submission to dictates of 
the instinct. The altruistic motives on the other hand require relentless philosophising to 
help regulate instinctive impulses in a manner ensuring both survival and self-control, an 
enlightened resolution of paradoxical endowments, though widely considered and 
interpreted as self-sacrifice. 
Positive laws of sociology merit an understanding both at the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal spheres. In the former case, it happens to be a system of self-regulation. The 
most reliable barometer for measuring the efficacy of each individual system is  personal 
integrity. Although the intrapersonal positive laws, usually called principles and/or 
convictions,  essentially happen to be intrinsic to a person, the social  environment is  the 
provider of major explanatory variables which determine  the relativity of selfish and 
altruistic  traits of an individual’s character. Therefore, interpersonal variations in 
behavioural patterns are frequently a source of conflict in human society, warranting  
widely  recognisable  and/or  generally  applicable positive laws for conflict resolution. 
These laws represent a continuum of both social norms and  governance structures 
including all prevalent forms of informal and  formal laws of sociology respectively.   
Social responsibility is therefore a phenomenon lying on the crossroad of 
intrapersonal and interpersonal spheres of the positive laws of sociology. Both logic and 
ethics vote in favour of socially responsible individual and collective human conduct: an 
altruistic act of one person/group serves the interest of the other and vice versa, while 
conduct blinded by self-interest would set in motion a collision course.2  Unfortunately, 
the former case universally   happens to be less prevalent  in practice because not only the 
persuasive  values for guidance of conduct are usually established without studying the 
motives and  impulses, the regulatory  rules also very often fail to take fuller account of 
the opportunity set, involving both  options and constraints, of  participants. This is as 
much true for CSR as it is for any other form of social responsibility, specifically in 
developing countries like Pakistan. The author agrees with the opinion of Pickford (1940) 
that in practice, a normative science such as ethics must be inextricably bound up with 
purely realistic psychology (p. 379).  It must, however, be added that the normative 
science of CSR also must not overlook   the context specific social physiology and social 
pathology since in this case one size does not fit all.    
2Indeed, majority of the social problems are symptomatic of  socially irresponsible  behaviours 
manifested in the actions that are apparently  advantageous to individuals/groups  within  a selfish, shortsighted  
view, but harmful to  the long run collective interest of the society including the individuals/groups originally 
responsible for those actions [for developing further insight into the argument, see Hardin (1968)].   
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That said, what usually fits all is the purely realistic psychology of the economic 
agents, universally translated into self-interest. Each and every member of human family 
always remains an economic agent on the consumption side of the spectrum. Similarly, 
with the exception of those identified with unmanageable mental and physical 
disabilities, people also remain producers, in one way or the other, for better part of their 
lifetimes. Although economic theory is limited in its application only to the producers 
and consumer making exchange in the market, its limitations ought not make those 
outside the market lesser of consumers and producers. Theory, nonetheless, provides the 
analytical framework to develop the cognition of purely realistic psychology of economic 
agents translated into impulses and motives of the consumers and producers for utility 
maximisation and profit maximisation respectively. The most sought after form of the 
latter is economic profit making, while economic profit is the producer surplus after the 
revenue has been accounted for all costs including the opportunity cost of production.3 In 
so far as CSR is considered to   add to the short-run costs of the firm, it fails to convince 
the purely realistic psychology which usually fears the long-run as a dead end.4   
II.   WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 
To begin with,  CSR is essentially a concept providing  ethical guidance to  profit 
seeking private corporations operating  in a market environment. The concept can’t 
therefore be applied to government departments, non-profit private companies and/or to  
organisations functioning under  socialist economic system.  
The debate on CSR has emerged through a process spanning over the entire length 
of last century, but the phenomenon still remains a subject of intense controversy. 
Therefore, management is hampered by the of lack of a paradigm which addresses both 
the “what” and the “how” of social corporate behaviour [Murray and Montanari (1986), 
p. 815].  Indeed, social responsibility was not intelligible   on the agenda of the corporate 
sector that largely   evolved in 18th and 19th century, the centuries widely identified with 
the first liberalist era responsible for ferociously ruthless form of capitalism   which 
ultimately invited the Communist Manifesto. In the next century, the innovative mantra of 
Ford assembly line and other technological developments doled out illusionary 
possibilities of unprecedented size of producer surplus. Unfortunately, the majority, 
driven by   short-sighted self-interest, went headlong through successive short-runs of 
vertical and horizontal industrial expansion until most of them plunged into the long-run 
which is  documented in the business archives under the unforgettable  heading of Great 
Depression. The latter is a colossal jinni, once  again   bottled up in a huge corporate  
3The area above the supply curve, between the competitive equilibrium price and the supply curve 
intercept, is called producer surplus. The term was introduced by Marshall (1925, p. 811) and, sometimes, it has 
been subject to controversy. For example, Mishan (1968) recommends that the term “producer’s surplus” be 
struck from the economist's vocabulary (p. 1279).  However, Mishan’s elaborate analytical model failed to defy 
the concrete phenomenon of producer surplus which essentially exists in  a producer’s psyche even when not 
verifiable from  firm’s  balance sheet. On a technical note, it is an empirically established theoretical construct 
that a monopoly, natural or legal, producing under favourable cost conditions may continue to have producer 
surplus even in the long-run. On the other extreme, a perfectly competitive market is usually perfect in an 
imperfect fashion, very often allowing some firms to make economic profit within an industry where, 
simultaneously, the sister firms might have been operating on or below their long-run optimum.  
4The dead end here is the metaphoric adaptation of the famous saying by John Maynard Keynes that in 
the long-run we all are dead.  
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vessel  which is now increasingly feared  to  breakdown anytime and release the monster 
to punish the humanity for collective sins  of complacency. The Asian crisis of 1990s and 
ongoing  financial  melt down  in North are the preambles of a  saga which threatens to 
render the earlier Great Depression   a tempest in the tea cup, given the spaghetti bowl of   
backward and forward linkages of today’s corporate world.5 
In the author’s opinion, it is the insight into the  spaghetti bowl which is behind the 
stockholder theory  for  business ethics. An analytical framework  which considers CSR 
simply  as a managerial obligation to maximise the financial returns to the stockholders 
[Bowie and Freeman (1992); Friedman (1962, 1997)].6  The theory is  pretty well 
justified, if the managers have the collectivist insight to seek after  profit making rather 
than  economic profit making.7 That said, this insight  usually  fails to make a manager 
one of the highest paid CEO in the real corporate world where the market tends to 
produce  monopolies which frequently happen to be coercive, if not unnatural and 
illegal; causing negative  externalities and  besetting   market failure of a magnitude  
which is currently  responsible for making US the champion of state managed economies; 
hence    validating    the argument  that the private pursuit of profit simply cannot be 
relied upon to secure the common good [Evan and Freeman (1988)] and CSR  ought  to 
go beyond profit making [Backman (1975); Davis (1960)].  
However, the domain lying outside the   tangible parameter of profit  is  ridden 
with controversies. Moreover, it goes without saying that long-run perfectively 
competitive optimum of a firm,  without committing deception or fraud, remains a 
prerequisite for corporate social responsiveness which, many argue, ought to  be 
considered as the managers having  a fiduciary duty not merely to the corporation’s 
stockholders, but to the corporation’s stakeholders. The  latter include  anyone who has a 
stake in or claim on the firm [Evan and Freeman (1988), p. 97] i.e.,  all those who can 
affect and are affected by the corporation. The literature on CSR widely considers 
stockholders, customers, employees, suppliers, community residents and the natural 
environment as primary stakeholders [Clarkson (1995); Starik (1995)].  Clarkson (1995) 
further incorporates into the panorama  government and communities, the group of  
public stakeholders   that provide infrastructure and market and whose laws and 
regulations, including taxes and other obligations,   must be obeyed.  
The vast canvass of stakeholders approach to CSR inevitably invites 
philosophical controversies. For example, Friedman (1962) maintains that managers  
5The author has coined the term  Spaghetti Bowl for backward and forward industrial linkages which 
are responsible for setting in motion a cumulative process of  industrial growth  both with a positive or a 
negative sign. The  dread of a negative growth sign, especially  in a world witnessing an ever increasing size of 
the Spaghetti Bowl, warrants   that the times when growth is positive are  monitored and regulated  with an 
insight favouring caution over complacent euphoria.     
6There is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition, without deception or fraud [Friedman (1962), p. 133)]. 
7In the microeconomic principles, profit making is a producer optimum where a firm covers all costs 
including the opportunity cost of production. While considering the assumptions of  perfectly competitive  
industry  (all firms being of equal size and efficiency, with unchanged techniques, some inelasticity in the 
supply of each factor, and an absence of external economies; [see, Mishan (1968), p. 1276]  a firm may have the 
ability to make economic profit only in the short-run, while the long-run optimum only allows profit making 
with a break-even. The latter happens to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for any measure of CSR.    
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ought not accomplish benevolent goals  without prior consent and due authorisation of 
the stockholders whose money is actually involved in  altruistic  transactions.  Indeed, 
spending other people’s money without their explicit consent will violate Kant’s principle 
of  persons having  absolute worth [Kant (1804-1981), p. 37]; namely, that one who 
breaches an agreement with a party is treating the person/persons of that party  merely as 
a means to her/his own ends rather than the other way around i.e. the other party being an 
end in itself. That said, the Kantian principle could be turned on its head while 
considering  that every human being is entitled to be treated as an end in herself/ himself 
rather than merely as a means to some other end.  Therefore, it can be morally justified to 
spend  stockholders’ money without their consent as long as it is done to promote the 
public interest [Donaldson (1982, 1989)]; and the firm’s  management has an obligation 
to act in the interests of the stakeholders as their agent [Evan and Freeman (1988), p. 
103].   
Finally, a large body of literature on CSR considers a corporate entity  as a set of 
interdependent relationships among primary stakeholders [Chakravarthy (1986); Evan 
and Freeman (1988); Hill and Jones (1992); Kotter and Heskett (1992); Harrison and . 
John (1994); Donaldson and Preston (1995); Jones (1995); Greenley and Foxall (1996)]. 
Some of the authors also maintain that effective stakeholders  management   leads to 
financial performance[Kotter and Heskett (1992); Harrison and John (1994)]. Indeed, 
many empirical studies have been carried out to determine the relationship between  CSR 
and financial performance. However, the researchers have largely failed to reach a 
consensus  on this issue. For example, Arlow and Gannon (1982) reviewed seven  
empirical studies and concluded that economic performance is not directly linked, in 
either a positive or negative fashion, to social responsiveness (p. 240). Similar findings 
were reported by Kenneth, et al. (1985),  whose study revealed that varying levels of  
corporate social orientation do not  correlate with their  performance differences.   
III.   STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS? 
In practice, there are different definitions of CSR both  within a country and between 
the countries. Indeed, it  is still  not an established term  in developing countries like 
Pakistan; though very much a  part of the  popular vocabulary of global business executives    
and organisations. The author has made an effort to go through a vast body of CSR 
literature relating to both North and South. Unfortunately, in the latter case the phenomenon 
does not appear to have emerged through a spontaneous process reflecting both social 
consciousness and mobilisation, as it has been the case in the North where the CSR happens 
to be a synthesis born of the archives recording a demographic composition  of enlightening 
one tenth of the people during the liberalist era of capitalist development;  the remaining 
nine tenth served only as the material and means to that end.8 On the contrary, the 
overabundant literature on CSR in decolonised South  embarrassingly  appears to be a 
recent corporate response to the foreign consumers and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Indeed, TBTs played up on the WTO forum by the developed countries, though 
still part of the Doha Round stalemate, are virtually operational in various disguises since 
after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in the 1990s.    
8The rhetoric is borrowed from Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer for January 1876, quoted in 
Dostoevsky (1873-1994), p. 727. 
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The argument in the foregoing is demonstratively supported by the relative age of 
the literature  on CSR in  developed and developing countries. The earliest study [Huxley 
(1945)] on CSR in the West  introduces the social man, the phenomenon which was to 
replace the economic man of the  age of liberalism. The latter, as mentioned earlier, 
invited  the  Communist Manifesto, but   still ensured the triumph of the economic man   
by turning the tide of socialism to the autocratic Russian empire, until Great Depression 
broke  out in the capitalist  citadels, namely; the United States of America (US) and 
Europe.9  
Huxley (1945) held that when a big employer talks about his democratic right to 
individual freedom, meaning thereby a claim to socially irresponsible control over a 
huge industrial concern and over the lives of tens of thousands of human beings whom it 
happens to employ, he is talking in a dying language (p.17). He considered  laisser-faire  
a false abstraction which, in his opinion, had lost relevance it once possessed.  Perhaps 
the  first ever echo of  stakeholders theory of CSR is  recorded in the following passage: 
But when Mr. Henry Ford, for instance, says that the principle of individual 
freedom gives him the right to do what he likes with his business, he is confusing 
the issue. He is now dealing with a large and powerful group, in which social 
relations ought to be the overruling consideration—relations of the management 
to the thousands of workmen employed, of the firm as a whole to the national 
economy, to the regional and local planning, and so on (p. 20). 
Author’s argument can be rejected by the die-hards on the solid basis that Julian 
Huxley, a biologist by training,   is neither known for a business researcher nor he wrote 
in a corporate journal. That said, the archives, unfortunately, do not end with Julian 
whose grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley, himself a writer,   lived in the times when the 
US corporate sector thrived successively on slavery and convict labour. Similarly,  it  
took  a long struggle, spanned almost over a century,   to eliminate child labour in Europe 
in 1920. It does not mean, however, that WTO rules on TBTs ought not to relate with 
CSR. The only problem is that not only the CSR literature on developing countries 
happens to have its  genesis in TBTs,  a large part of the literature is a vivid reflection  of 
the same phenomena [see, for example, Blowfield (2003, 2004); Dolan and Opondo 
(2005); Schrage and Ewing (2005); Hussain (2004); Kaufman, et al. (2004); Nielsen 
(2004)].  
Furthermore, the arguments  of the CSR studies on developing countries are 
advanced  with an apologetic tone rather than a self-assured rhythm. The earliest work 
referred in the literature  on CSR in developing countries is by Visser and Macintosh 
(1998). The authors attempt to take pride in the religious tradition of Asia  homing 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.   The  ethical condemnation of usurious 
business practices  by all these faiths is considered  an example  of CSR  in the region  
dating back thousands of years. Similarly, Frynas (2006) quotes the 4th century BC 
Indian statesman  and philosopher Kautilya who advocated the business practices based  
9The author has always held the position that Keynesian economics was more of a an antidote  for  the 
looming threat of socialism than it was a cure for the Great Depression. Thus, the Marshall Plan to reconstruct 
Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II was a timely  response to Europe’s dollar gap crisis which 
otherwise might have been responsible for another  Animal Farm, denying US all chances of world supremacy 
[for further support of the argument, [see, Khan (2008)].      
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on moral principles. In Far East Asia, Nelson (2004) gives the credit for CSR to the  
Buddhist traditions of the region. This naïve  approach to CSR  in Asia also finds its 
counterpart in Latin America.   Vives (2006)  reported, after surveying over 1,300 small 
and medium-sized enterprises in the region,  that the  religious beliefs of people in Latin 
America  are one of the major motivations for CSR, while Logsdon, et al. (2006)  relate 
the phenomenon to the pre-Hispanic  cultural traditions of community self-help and 
solidarity. 
Not only the religious cultural and traditional appreciation of CSR in developing 
countries is a late appearance  in the literature, coinciding with the erection of TBTs in 
the post-Uruguay Round era, the argument  analysed in the foregoing is clearly out of  
context while considering that origin of CSR  lies  in the controversies of capitalist 
expansion during the last century.  The author is again tempted to refer to Huxley (1945) 
who, in spite of his deficit  of the relevant expertise, encompassed both  the contemporary 
rationale for CSR and its  and cultural parallel in Europe:  
Our old order  contains two principles which, derived from very different 
historical sources, have now combined to deadlock progress. One is the liberal 
principle of economic individualism and the sacredness of profit motive; the other 
is the conservative principle of class privilege based on property and on social 
position. In a society based on these principles, social services are considered a 
mixture of charity and of Palliatives designed to patch up defects in the system. 
For the most part, the individual human being or the groups that go to make up 
the nation are tied together by impersonal bonds such as the economic motives, 
not by a living framework of rights and duties.  Consumers, being unorganised 
and without the force of profit motive behind them, find their interests neglected as 
against those of producers and distributors (p. 18). 
The upshot is that CSR  happens to be a Western term where it  is mainly  linked 
with big firms, the firms whose  activities are visibly  present for  public  rating. 
Moreover, with the advent of neoliberalist era CSR has lost the status that the 
phenomenon once held in the  developed countries’ academic  circles of  business  
management.10 The  criteria  for evaluating the globally most admired 10 companies, 
reported in the Fortune magazine, is a case in point.11 
In the developing countries on the other hand the largest number of businesses still 
takes the form of sole proprietorship  or partnership. As a matter of fact, developing 
countries, even when considered as one entity, poorly compare with US and Japan alone 
who, by the end of 1980s, together accounted for 70 percent of total global capitalisation 
[Becker, et al.  (1990)]. This is evident from the fact that, by the end of 1980s,   India and  
10Indeed, the Western literature on CSR  owes its origins to   an implicit   paradigm that emerged from 
the cold war between socialist and capitalist blocks.  Hence it is  all but a coincidence that the largest body of 
Western CSR literature  appeared in  the years   before the  triumphant hegemony of neoliberalists,  recorded in 
the  Washington Consensus on the Thatcherite and Reaganite economic agenda [see, for example,  Bauer 
(1972);  Moskowitz (1972, 1975); Dierkes  and Bauer (1973);   Abt (1974); Anshen, (1974);    Linowes (1974);  
Sethi (1974); Davis and Blomstrom (1975); Lerbinger (1975);  Bowman  and Haire (1975);  Folger  and Nutt 
(1975); Heinze (1976);  Holmes (1977); Keim (1978); Ingram (1978)]. 
11The criteria includes in order of appearance innovativeness, quality of management, employees’ 
talent, financial soundness, use of corporate assets, long-term investment value, social responsibility, quality of 
products, globalness.  
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Pakistan ranked 85th and  92nd in the world  league table of corporate size, with  average 
company size of US$19.1 and US$6.6 million respectively. These measures poorly 
compare with Japan  who ranked 13th in the same table  with average company size of 
US$911.3 million [Standard and Poors (2002), p. 27]. Table 1 in the following provides  
three  broad  measures for comparison of the corporate sector of Japan  with four major  
South Asian countries at the end of 1999.     
Table 1 
Stock Exchange Market: South Asia and Japan (1999) 
Market Capitalisation 
Country 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
US$ Billion (% of GDP) 
Average 
Company Size 
US$ Million 
Turnover 
US$ Billion 
Bangladesh 211 0.9 1.9 4.01 0.8 
India 5863 185 41.5 31.5 279 
Pakistan 765 7 11.9 9.09 21 
Sri Lanka 239 1.6 10.1 6.6 0.2 
Japan 2470 4547 104.6 1841 1849 
Source: Standard and Poors (2002).  
The GDP measure of market capitalisation shows in Table 1 that  the corporate 
sector in Japan, the second largest economy of the world,  is much more influential  than 
the corporate sector in India, leave alone Pakistan or any other country in South Asia. 
Although India appears to have an edge over Japan in terms of the number of corporation 
registered on the stock exchange market, her average company size is much small than 
that of Japan. However,  both India and Pakistan  have shown progress in average 
company size compared to the end of 1980s. That said,  the decade of 1990s  was a 
period of  cut throat global competition where not only the new markets were emerging, 
the players already in the market were also strengthening their strongholds, as is  evident 
by the average size of Japanese companies which, compared to their size at  end of 1980s, 
were more than twice bigger at the end of 1999. Finally, a very high turnover rate in 
Pakistan, compared to other four countries listed in Table 1, invites some heart searching 
by those who believe that  speculative investment is one of the most reliable barometers 
for determining socially responsible performance of the  corporate sector.   More 
specifically, the foul play of inside trading, if goes undetected,  is  sometimes responsible 
for high turnover rate. Indeed, both these issues  ought to be fundamental to any measure 
of CSR in emerging markets.   
Table 2 provides more recent information on the  relative significance of corporate 
sector in South Asia and two largest economies of the world,  US and Japan. India ranks 
13th in terms of the absolute size of market capitalisation and also fares pretty well while 
considering the GDP measure. However, it still has to go a long way to match the two 
largest economies of the world on the per capita measure of market capitalisation. 
Pakistan with  a rank at 51 is much below India also on the per capita account of market 
capitalisation, while faring a little less poorly on the GDP measure. 
The figures listed in Table 1 and Table 2 are  representations  of the developing 
countries’ effort to catch up with the global capitalist development. Baskin (2006) studied  
three  generic  indicators  of  CSR  on  the  data  for  127 leading  firms from 21 emerging  
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Table 2 
Market Capitalisation in South Asia: International Comparisons 
Market Capitalisation in 2005* 
Country US$ Billion US$ Per Capita Per US$ 1,000 of GDP 
Bangladesh 4 87 21 109 51 104 
India 819 13 505 81 686 39 
Pakistan 46 51 295 87 415 51 
Sri Lanka 8 73 292 88 244 72 
Japan 4,737 2 37,070 18 1,045 25 
United States 16,998 1 57,346 7 1,369 15 
Source: Nation Master, accessed on November 16, 2008.  
*Italic figures represent the country rank in the league table for each of the three   separate measures of market 
capitalisation.  
markets across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe.  The 
findings reveal that firms representing the emerging markets  have a respectable 
representation in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and show rising levels of take-up of 
the Global Reporting Initiative and ISO 14001. The author, however,  identifies that 
competitive advantage in international  markets remains  one of the key drivers for CSR 
in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. Similar conclusions are recorded by Araya 
(2006) whose survey of top 250 companies in Latin America revealed  that businesses 
with an international sales orientation were almost five times more likely to report on 
CSR than companies that sold  products regionally or locally. 
Finally, a sizeable part of market capitalisation in South accounts for foreign direct 
investment and standardisation imposed by multinationals, striving to achieve  
consistency among their  global subsidiaries and operations, is one of the major drivers 
behind   formal practices of CSR in recipient countries. The  findings of Asia study by 
Chapple and Moon (2005) suggest  that multinational companies are more likely to adopt 
CSR than those operating solely in their home country. However, the  authors also  
pointed out   that the profile of  multinationals CSR tends to reflect the profile of the 
country of operation rather than the country of origin (p. 415).   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The normative science of CSR must not tailor a straight jacket for the context 
specific economic physiology and social pathology. The phenomenon did not evolve in 
its own right even in the Western corporate world which, after failing the stockholders in 
the 1930s, had to extend its social accountability matrix to the inclusion of stakeholders 
in an atmosphere charged with the revolutionary hype. In the developing countries on the 
other hand, CSR is a recent arrival. The available literature on the subject shows that 
CSR is being warmly courted by part of the corporate sector having direct stakes in WTO 
measures under Non-agricultural Manufacturing Access (NAMA). The global trading 
interests of the business community in countries like Pakistan warrant appeasement of 
foreign consumers by giving in to TBTs which are still not binding in the backdrop of 
Doha Round stalemate. Not only the CSR rhetoric is inconsistent with the reality check in 
the South, its proclaimed targets appear to create serious distortions involving suboptimal 
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choices which manifestly compromise the image of domestic consumer in favour of the 
consumer in the West. More importantly, in the presence of the Bastille erected by their  
agricultural subsidies, CSR backdoor  in  developing countries also conveniently spares 
the West from organising inconvenient Rounds of trade talks for getting the  TBTs 
through.   
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